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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
             
 
No. 09-4228 
             
 
EVA-PIA REICH,  
                              Appellant 
v. 
 
SCHERING-PLOUGH CORPORATION 
 
           
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-07-cv-01508) 
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
 
          
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 25, 2010 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 29, 2010) 
 
           
 
 OPINION 
            
 
  
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Dr. Eva-Pia Reich, Ph.D appeals from the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Schering-Plough Corp, on Reich’s 
claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1.  We will affirm. 
I.   
Factual and Procedural Background 
 In June 1999, Schering hired Reich, then fifty-five years old, as a Principal 
Scientist.  She initially worked under the supervision of Dr. Paul Zadovny and focused on 
in-vivo (living) experiments.  In her performance reviews, Zadovny gave Reich positive 
ratings in the categories of “Cross-Functional Teamwork” and the subcategories under 
“Leadership.”  Zadovny, however, was not trained as an in-vivo biologist.   
 In early 2003, Schering raised its performance expectations, but continued to use 
the cross-functional teamwork and leadership categories as performance benchmarks.  
About a year later, Dr. Jay Fine replaced Zadovny as Reich’s supervisor.  At the time 
Reich was assigned to Fine’s group in 2004, Reich was fifty-nine years old and Fine was 
forty-two.  
 In Reich’s 2004 mid-year review, Fine suggested Reich could improve in the areas 
of cross-functional teamwork and scientific leadership.  Unlike Zadovny, Fine was 
  
trained as an in-vivo biologist.  He rated Reich’s overall mid-year performance as “AE” 
or “At Expectations,” a positive rating under the new system.  App. at 588-89.  
Nonetheless, Reich was disappointed because she believed that she was entitled to a 
higher rating.   
 For her 2004 year-end review, Fine again rated Reich’s work as AE.  Although 
Reich did not believe Fine gave her the AE evaluations because of her age, she complains 
that Fine gave her vague and unhelpful guidance.  In contrast, Fine’s notes detail the 
specific guidance he gave Reich with respect to communication and leadership.  
 In early 2005, Schering heightened its leadership expectations.  In May of that 
year, Fine told Reich he had attempted to have her demoted because he had too many 
“senior scientists” in his work group.  App. at 878.  Although there were Senior Scientists 
at Schering, Reich was a Principal Scientist and considered Fine’s comment to be a 
remark regarding her age.  
 In her 2005 mid-year review, Fine gave Reich an overall rating of “BE” or “Below 
Expectations,” noting she had failed to meet expectations with respect to developing 
effective cross-functional relationships and demonstrating consistent scientific leadership.  
In early 2006, Fine informed Reich that she was being placed on a three-month 
Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), which included the warning: “[f]ailure to take 
the required action to improve your performance will result in more severe action, which 
may include termination of your employment.”  App. at 573.  
  
 In May 2006, Fine had his two-month PIP discussion with Reich, giving her 
positive feedback on her technical performance, but again noting Reich needed to 
improve her scientific leadership and communication skills.  On June 1, Reich filed a 
charge of age discrimination with the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights.  When Reich 
informed Human Relations that she had filed a complaint, the person to whom she spoke 
stated, “oh, no, you shouldn’t have done that . . . .”  App. at 886.  Schering did not begin 
an internal investigation until after it received a formal copy of Reich’s complaint on 
June 21 from the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights.  On June 22, Reich gave her final 
PIP presentation.  
 Schering terminated Reich’s employment, on Fine’s recommendation, on June 27, 
2006.  Reich amended her charge of age discrimination to include retaliatory discharge in 
violation of the ADEA and NJLAD.  The District Court granted Schering’s motion for 
summary judgment on Reich’s claims, concluding that although Reich had established 
prima facie cases of both age discrimination and retaliation, Schering had articulated 
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions and Reich had not sufficiently 
demonstrated that those reasons were pretextual.  This timely appeal followed.1
II.   
   
 
                                                 
1 The District Court exercised federal question jurisdiction over Reich’s 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction over the final 
  
Analysis2
 The only evidence Reich introduced regarding alleged age discrimination 
 
 We evaluate claims under the ADEA and NJLAD under the framework articulated 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in which the burden of 
production shifts between the claimant and respondent.  See Smith v. City of Allentown, 
589 F.3d 684, 689-90 (3d Cir. 2009) (ADEA claim); Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, 
Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 403 (3d Cir. 2007) (NJLAD claim).  The burden of persuasion, 
however, remains on the claimant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age 
was the “but-for” cause of the challenged adverse employment action.  Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Serv., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009); Smith, 589 F.3d at 690-91.  Reich claims the 
District Court erred in concluding she had failed to meet her final burden under the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to present sufficient evidence “to meaningfully throw 
into question” Schering’s reasons for its actions, or “from which a factfinder could 
reasonably conclude that an illegitimate factor more likely than not was a motivating or 
determinative cause” of those actions.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 
1994).  
                                                                                                                                                             
decision of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Reich, we exercise plenary 
review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Schering.  See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 566 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
  
consisted of a remark by Fine four or five years earlier, before he became her supervisor, 
referring to a job applicant as “that old guy,” App. at 771, and his 2006 comment asking 
staff members about another applicant, “Young and cute huh, ladies?  What do you think 
about that, you think you would like to have him in the department?”  App. at 876.  The 
District Court concluded that Fine’s “throw-away remarks [were] too removed in time 
and too de minimis to constitute direct or indirect evidence of age-based animus.”  App. 
at 30.  See also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Thus, the court concluded that “[t]aken as a whole, the evidence [Reich] has 
adduced is not sufficient to permit the inference of discrimination or retaliatory 
termination . . . .”  App. at 30.  We agree.     
 Reich emphasizes she offered evidence “of significant inconsistencies between Jay 
Fine’s formal evaluations of [her] performance with the evaluations from her prior 
supervisor, inconsistency between [Fine]’s daily feedback regarding her work and his 
formal evaluations, [and] the purely subjective nature of his criticism . . . .”  Appellant’s 
Reply Br. at 5; see Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“cloaking [subjective] criteria with an appearance of objectivity does not 
immunize an employment decision”); Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (claimant must show 
“weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in” 
employer’s reasons).  Schering, however, was neither inconsistent nor improperly reliant 
                                                                                                                                                             
law.  Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
  
on subjective criteria here.  See Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“The fact that an employee disagrees with an employer’s evaluation of h[er] does not 
prove pretext.”), overruled in part on other grounds, St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502 
(1993).   
 The District Court gave careful consideration to Reich’s claims.  It concluded that 
Reich established a prima facie claim of discrimination, but that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Schering had a nondiscriminatory basis for terminating Reich, and that 
Reich did not produce sufficient evidence of retaliation such that a reasonable juror could 
find in her favor.  We agree.  Reich has failed to demonstrate the District Court erred.   
III.   
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
